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UNJUST DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES AT
WILL: ARE DISCLAIMERS A FINAL
SOLUTION?
I. Introduction
Despite the description of the 1980's as the "Age of the Entre-
preneur,"' the majority of persons in the American labor force today
work in the private sector 2 and are thus subject to the protean
common law doctrine of employment at will.3
1. Parrish, Why Many Women Opt to Go It Alone, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1986, at C2, col. 3. "President Reagan has called this [decade] the 'Age of the
Entrepreneur' . . . [a time when the] most dynamic segment of the United S[tates']
economy [consists of] small entrepreneurial businesses .... ." Id.
2. A current analysis of the United States work force reveals a total 1985
population, including those persons over 16 years of age and members of the
United States Armed Forces, but excluding inmates of penal institutions and patients
in public and privately owned sanitariums, of 180 million. See Current Labor
Statistics, 109 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 57, 80 (Nov. 1986). The actual labor force,
consisting of all employed or unemployed civilians plus members of the Armed
Forces stationed in the United States, but excluding those persons who are retired,
engaged in their own housework, disabled, discouraged from actively seeking em-
ployment, voluntarily idle, or students, was 117 million people. See id. Of this
total, 107 million civilians were actively employed. See id. Approximately 16 million
of these workers were. employed in the public sector, working for state or the
federal government. See id. The total number of workers in the private sector,
excluding agricultural workers, was approximately 88 million. See id. The percentage
of unionized wage and salary workers in the private sector has declined in recent
years. See Adams, Changing Employment Patterns of Organized Workers, 108
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25, 26 (Feb. 1985). In 1980, for example, out of approximately
71 million of these workers, 14 million or 20% were unionized. See id. In 1984,
however, the number of employed wage and salary workers in the private sector
rose to 75 million, but only 12 million or 160 reported union participation. See
id. One commentator predicted that union participation by non-agricultural workers
will decline further to 10% of the work force. See Finkin, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 727, 727 (1985) [hereinafter Finkin]; see
also Doyle, Area Wage Surveys Shed Light on Decline in Unionization, 108 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 13 (Sept. 1985) (describing decline in union strength and popularity).
But see N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1985, at A26, col. 1 (Lane Kirkland, leader of AFL-
CIO, predicts resurgence in unions). In sum, the "tide of unionization has been
receding rather than advancing, leaving an ever-increasing number of employees
without protection against unjust discharge." Stieber, Most U.S. Workers Still May
Be Fired Under the Employment-at- Will Doctrine, 107 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36
(May 1985) [hereinafter Stieber].
3. Employment at will describes a situation in which the employer/employee
relationship is severable at any time by either party for any or no reason and
without future consequences. See, e.g., L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST Dis-
MIssAL § 1.01, at 1-2 (1985) [hereinafter LAsoN & BOROWSKY]; DeGiuseppe, The
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Current scholarly' and popular5 debates over the continued ap-
plication of this doctrine reveal the inherent conflict found in any
Effect of the Employment-at- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and
Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 8 (1981) [hereinafter Employee Rights];
see infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
4. Many commentators advocate a progressive approach towards the expansion
of employees' rights in at-will employment situations. See, e.g., Blades, Employment
at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); DeGiuseppe, The Recognition of Public
Policy Exceptions to the Employment-At- Will Rule: A Legislative Function?, 11
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721 (1983) [hereinafter A Legislative Function]; Employee
Rights, supra note 3, at 1; Estreicher, At-Will Employment and the Problem of
Unjust Dismissal: The Appropriate Judicial Response, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 146 (1982);
Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers-The Contract
of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and
Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082 (1984) [hereinafter The Rights
of Individual Workers]; Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) [hereinafter Time for a Statute];
Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter The Public Policy Exception];
Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter The
Duty to Terminate in Good Faith]. Other commentators advocate a hard line
approach to employment at will. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 2, at 728; Power,
A Defense of the At Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881 (1983); Note, Limiting
the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer? 35
VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982); Note, The Development of Exceptions to At-Will
Employment: A Review of the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51 U.
CIN. L. REV. 616 (1982).
5. The increasing controversy concerning the viability of the employment at
will doctrine has prompted authors to forewarn managers of potential problems
that could arise after employee terminations. See, e.g., R. BAXTER & G. SINISCALCO,
MANAGER'S GUIDE TO LAWFUL TERMINATIONS 77-108 (1983); R. BRADY, EMPLOYMENT
AT WILL: How To AVOID BEING SUED WHEN You HIRE, FIRE & DISCIPLINE 18-25
(1983) [hereinafter BRADY]; T. CONDON, "FIRE ME & I'LL SUE!" A MANAGER'S
SURVIVAL GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 59-65 (1984-85); see also Andresky, Fear of
Firing, FORBES, Dec. 2, 1985, at 85 (managers are encouraged to leave employees
"fretting" about the security of their jobs); English, Why It's Harder to Fire
Workers These Days, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 4, 1984, at 96-97 (United
States map depicting current status of employment at-will doctrine by state); Rose,
Employment Contracts: Difficult To Get but They're Great to Have, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 2, 1985, at 15, col. 4 (advocating employment contracts to preserve executives'
rights and bargaining power); Labor Letter, Wall St. J., July 30, 1985, at 1, col.
5 (employer disclaimer regarding any job security gains additional weight in de-
termining no cause of action for wrongful discharge); Jacobs, Changes in Em-
ployment Laws Can Trap Unwary Companies, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 25,
col. 1 (employers can avoid dismissal suits by maintaining careful documentation
of employee records and improving general personnel procedures) [hereinafter Jacobs].
But see W. OUIrEN, THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES 3-43 (1984) (describing expansion of at-
will employees' rights in current labor market) [hereinafter OUTTEN]; Foegen, Pink
Slips for Troublemakers: Employees Fight the Firing Squad, Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 19, 22
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developing area of the law. 6 Employers claim that any limitation
on their right to hire and fire at will for any cause or for no cause
will adversely affect their profitability and ultimately the health of
the entire economy. 7 Employees, however, assert their actual8 and
perceived9 rights to fair treatment during the hiring process, 10 during
(Winter 1984) ("Ultimately ... [employment at will] 'boils down to' mutual integrity
.... [E]mployees deserve protection against casual termination .... Employers
likewise deserve recourse ... against unreasonable judicial harassment").
6. See The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note 4, at 1105. "[Contradictory
decisions in employment at will cases] are the hallmark of a body of law in
transition, particularly when courts attempt quietly to abandon outmoded doctrines
by invoking other doctrines as exceptions or limitations." Id.; see also Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505, 511-12 (1980). In
Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized "the capacity of the common
law to develop and adapt to current needs," and held that an employee has a
cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to public
policy. 84 N.J. at 71, 417 A.2d at 511-12.
7. See Employee Rights, supra note 3, at 3; see also Payne v. Western & Atl.
R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), rev'd on other grounds, Hutton v. Watlers,
132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). The Payne court stated: "All may dismiss
their employe[es] at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong," 81
Tenn. at 519-20, thus representing the quintessential idea underlying the traditional
employment at will principle.
8. Union employees can pursue grievance procedures established in collective
bargaining agreements. See Stieber, supra note 2, at 36. These agreements typically
prohibit dismissal in the absence of "just cause." See OUTTEN, supra note 5, at
5. Public sector employees may seek constitutional protection if an employer violates
a fundamental right of an employee. See id. at 7. Even traditional at-will employees
may seek the protection of federal and state statutes which prohibit discrimination
or different treatment based upon specific characteristics. See infra note 13.
9. The recently developed cause of action for wrongful or abusive discharge
pushes the employment relationship to its furthest limits by providing that an
employee should have protection against an employer's unfair or capricious ter-
mination of the employee's job. See infra notes 143-65. The concept of fairness
in employment has progressed since contrary Supreme Court decisions during the
early 1900's. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. For example, in Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), Justice Day stated, "[t]he law should be as zealous
to protect the constitutional liberty of the employ[ee] as it is to guard that of the
employer . . . [i]t should not be necessary to the protection of the liberty of one
citizen that the same right in another citizen be abridged or destroyed." 236 U.S.
at 40 (Day, J., dissenting) (holding Kansas statute unconstitutional that for-
bade employers from making a non-union agreement a condition of employment).
But see Finkin, supra note 2, at 731-33 (stating that employment at will. is fair,
efficient and minimizes governmental interference with freedom of contract). It
should be noted that employment terminable at will may also benefit the employee,
since "[i]t also allows employees reciprocally to monitor managerial performance.
If employees become dissatisfied, if management behaves arbitrarily or abusively,
the employee is free to quit." Id. at 731.
10. See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 25, col. 1; see also OUTTEN, supra note 5, at
13-26.
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the course of their employment" and after their discharge. 12 Concern
about equitable treatment in employment has prompted Congress to
enact protective legislation'3 for certain segments of the workforce. 14
Nevertheless, the unsettled question of whether the employment at
will doctrine is viable continues to affect every employer/employee
relationship that is not governed by such protective legislation or
collective bargaining agreements.
Courts have addressed four theories that have substantially weak-
ened the impact of the employment at will doctrine in wrongful
discharge suits.' 5 These theories include: (1) the public policy ex-
ception to arbitrary termination; 6 (2) the implied employment con-
tract that preserves employment unless termination is for "cause"; 7
(3) the tort of "abusive discharge"; 8 and (4) the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 9
This Note maintains that courts should use a balancing approach
in the analysis of wrongful discharge disputes. It first discusses the
historical foundations of the employment at will doctrine. 0 It then
critically examines the current status of the four theories used to
11. Protective legislation preserves private employees' rights to a safe and healthy
workplace. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1982). These employees are also entitled to specified wages and hours
of work, see Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), and to equal
work regardless of sex. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
Pension rights are also protected, see Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
12. Wrongful discharge occurs when an employer violates the following limi-
tations to her discretion to fire an employee: "(1) 'just cause' requirements endemic
to public sector employment and union membership; (2) statutory restrictions on
employment-related discrimination based on age, sex, race, national origin, handicap,
or related categories, and on retaliation against employees for protected activity;
and (3) judicially established limitations rooted in public policy or in a broad view
of an employee's rights under an employment contract." OUTTEN, supra note 5,
at 35-36; see also Employee Rights, supra note 3, at 16-23; infra note 13.
13. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (prohibiting
termination based upon handicap); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2a (1982) (Title VII) (prohibiting termination from employment based upon
race or sex); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting termination of employment based upon age);
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (pro-
hibiting termination based upon certain union activity).
14. See OUTTEN, supra note 5, at 10-11.
15. See infra notes 57-182 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 83-142 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
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weaken this doctrine.21 It next analyzes four possible resolutions to
employer/employee conflicts in the context of employment termi-
nations. 22 These resolutions include: (1) unionization of those em-
ployees who want protection; 23 (2) judicial decree to define the current
status and direction of the law, including disclaimers in personnel
applications or manuals;2 4 (3) voluntary approaches by employers
that would insure fair treatment and include arbitration of disputes;
25
and (4) a legislative solution that would balance the rights of em-
ployees with those of employers, to promote equitable treatment of
the workforce without detracting from robust economic perform-
ance.
2 6
II. Origins and Current Status of the Employment at Will
Doctrine
The following section traces the historical development of the
employment at will doctrine from English feudal law to its incor-
poration into American law. The next section discusses the four theories
currently used by terminated employees in wrongful discharge suits.
A. Historical Foundations of Employment at Will
The development of the employment at will doctrine had its origin
in principles of English law derived from feudal theories of master
and servant. 27 The "English Rule," 2 as articulated by Sir William
Blackstone, raised a presumption that the employer had hired the
employee for one year.2 9 This presumption was limited by the pre-
scription against arbitrary termination set forth in the Statute of
21. See infra notes 57-182 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 183-223 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 202-li and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
27. English feudal law gradually changed as the agrarian economy became more
industrialized. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-22 (1976) (overview of development of English
feudal law); see also LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.02, at 2-2; Employee
Rights, supra note 3, at 3-5.
28. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.02, at 2-2.
29. Blackstone's rule applied to all classes of servants and stated: "If the
hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be
a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve,
and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective
seasons; as well when there is work to be done as when there is not .... ." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425.
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Labourers.30 In addition, contrary manifestations of the parties3
rebutted this presumption of one-year employment as long as the
employment agreement incorporated reasonable notice.32 Modern
English labor statutes have incorporated reasonable notice of ter-
mination. 3
Early American cases rejected the one-year employment presump-
tion.34 Jurisdictions diverged, however, in the way they determined
the length of the employment contract." Some jurisdictions followed
the presumption that the employment relationship lasted at least for
the duration of the specified payment period,36 while others consid-
ered the relationship in accordance with the facts of each case and
the intent and customs of the parties." The transformation of the
domestic servant to the commercial employee,3" industrial expansion39
and the acceptance of a laissez faire economic theory40 contributed
further to tension in the definition of the employment relationship.
In 1877, Horace G. Wood proposed a harsh solution to this con-
troversy. 41 In his treatise, Wood characterized employment relation-
ships as terminable at will.42 In 1895, the New York Court of Appeals
30. 5 Eliz. 4 (1562). Although this statute was repealed by the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, § 17 (1875), it introduced the
concept that termination of employment required the employer to give reasonable
notice, and apprentices could be discharged only "on reasonable cause." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *426; Employee Rights, supra note 3, at 4 nn.5 & 7.
31. See Feinman, supra note 27, at 120-21.
32. See id.
33. The Contracts of Employment Act of 1963 prescribed notice from one to
eight weeks. See id. This Act has since been consolidated in the Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 and the Employment Act 1980. Fenn & Whelan,
Remedies for Dismissed Employees in the U.K.: An Economic Analysis, 1-2 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 205, 206, 222 n.5 (1981-82).
34. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.03, at 2-5.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 2-5 & nn.2-6.
37. See Feinman, supra note 27, at 123.
38. See id. at 124.
39. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 66, 417 A.2d 505,
509 (1980).
40. See id.
41. H. WooD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at
272 (1878) [hereinafter WOOD]. Wood's treatise was remarkably unsupported. See
Annotation, Contract of Hiring-Duration, 11 A.L.R. 469, 476 (1917) (cited in
LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.04, at 2-7 & 2-10 n.16). The treatise,
however, was widely accepted. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.04, at
2-7 ("[o]ne reason for this acceptance may have been the unsettled state of the law
on the subject; Wood's rule at least suggested a rationale by which courts could
reach consistent decisions, rather than having to engage in an elaborate factual
analysis in each case").
42. Wood's treatise proved an attractive guideline for the courts, as compared
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adopted this new "American Rule ' 43 in Martin v. New York Life
Insurance Co.4 In the early 1900's, the Supreme Court also adopted
the rule. 45
The first statutory exception to the rule was the enactment of the
National Labor Relations Act 46 in 1935, which limited the employment
at will doctrine in two ways. 47 It protected employees from dismissal
in retaliation for their union activity and preserved employee rights
to bargain collectively for advantageous employment contracts. 48 An
additional federal statutory protection for employees from an em-
ployer's unfettered right to fire was Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,49 which prohibited discriminatory dismissal.5 0
B. Doctrines Limiting Employment at Will
Judicial inroads into the employment at will doctrine have included
the "public policy" exception," implied contractual protection 2 and
the "abusive discharge" cause of action. 3 State legislative inroads
have included the enactment of "whistleblowing" statutes, which
with the time-consuming case-by-case analysis. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra
note 3, § 2.04, at 2-7. Wood wrote that "the rule is inflexible, that a general or
indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make
it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof . . . it is
an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party." WooD, supra
note 41, § 134, at 272.
43. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.04, at 2-6.
44. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
45. The trio of Supreme Court cases which firmly advocated the employment
at will rule were Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In each of these
cases, state or federal legislation protecting workers was struck down as uncon-
stitutional because the legislation interfered with both the employer's and the
employee's right to contract. Justice Pitney, writing for the majority in Coppage,
holding unconstitutional a Kansas law that prohibited employers from forbidding
union membership, stated: "No doubt, wherever the right of private property
exists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens
that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circum-
stances." Coppage, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
46. See supra note 13.
47. See LASON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 2.05, at 2-11 to -12.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 13.
50. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a) states that "[i]t shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to ... discharge any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a(l) (1982).
51. See infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 83-144 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
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protect employees from retaliatory discharge when they report illegal.
activities by employers.54 Puerto Rico is the only jurisdiction, how-
ever, that has adopted a broad statute requiring "just cause" for
termination." Such model statutes have been proposed on the in-
ternational level.5 6
1. The Public Policy Exception to Arbitrary Discharge
An exception to the employment at will doctrine occurs when
employees are fired in a way contrary to public policy consid-
erations.17 Although one commentator has stated that the public
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine sounds in con-
tract,58 most commentators describe the exception as a cause of
action in tort.5 9 Nevertheless, the term "public policy" is not easily
defined. 6° In order to support a cause of action for retaliatory
54. Many states have enacted such legislation. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1102.5 (West Supp. 1986); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1983); 1986
Fla. Laws ch. 233; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 63bl19c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986);
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (Burns 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 19A.19, 20A.1
(West Supp. 1986); 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws H.B. 2621; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, §§ 831-40 (Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 12(G) (1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 15.361-.369 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102, 48-1114 (Supp.
1986); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-
11.1-04 (Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1601 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.035
(1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -21-9 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.40.010 to -40.070 (Supp. 1987).
55. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (Supp. 1983). This unique statute provides
the following examples of "good cause for discharge": improper worker conduct;
inefficient work performance; repeated violations of reasonable work rules; tem-
porary, full or partial closing of the workplace; reduction in workforce due to
technological changes or reductions in product output. See id. § 185b (Supp. 1983).
The statute expressly forbids termination due to the whim of the employer or due
to a reason unrelated to the workplace. See id. Employees who are wrongfully
discharged may be awarded an amount equal to one month's salary plus one week
of salary for each year of the employee's service. See id. § 185a (Supp. 1983).
56. See Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 210-17 (1983) (discussing an International Labor
Organization Convention proposed "just cause" termination referendum for which
125 other countries' representatives voted in favor but the United States' repre-
sentative opposed) [hereinafter Bellace].
57. See A Legislative Function, supra note 4, at 753.
58. See The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note 4, at 1102, see also
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 566, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841
(1983) (holding that contractual remedies such as reinstatement and back pay are
the more appropriate remedies for wrongful discharge suits).
59. See A Legislative Function, supra note 4, at 755-56; The Public Policy
Exception, supra note 4, at 1936-37.
60. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981), an employee was discharged both for supplying information to local
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discharge, an employee must prove his employer terminated him in
violation of a "clear mandate of public policy. ' 61 Examples of such
violations include termination for refusing to commit an unlawful
act; 62 for performing an important public duty; 63 or for exercising
law enforcement authorities about suspected theft and agreeing to assist in the
investigation. 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79. Justice Simon of the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed the difficulty of determining whether this discharge violated
public policy:
[T]he Achilles heel . . . lies in the definition of public policy. When a
discharge contravenes public policy in any way the employer has com-
mitted a legal wrong .... But what constitutes clearly mandated public
policy? . . . [I]t can be said that public policy concerns what is right
and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to
be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions. . . . [The] matter must strike at the heart
of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will
be allowed.
Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (citations omitted). This all-encompassing definition
was sharply criticized as being too broad and an example of judicial overreaching.
See id. at 881-86 (Ryan, J., dissenting). However, a possible approach is determining
whether the discharge violates the public conscience, because " 'public policy' is
not a rigidly defined concept . . . . [I]t is loose and amorphous, bending as society's
needs and values change . . . . [A] 'public policy exception' to a doctrine or principle
of law . . . can be based on either statutory underpinnings or on an inherent sense
of justice essential for the purpose of preventing injury to the public." Note, Public
Policy Limitations to the Employment-At- Will Doctrine since Geary v. United States
Steel Corporation, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 1115, 1121-22 (1983) [hereinafter Public
Policy Limitations to the Employment-At- Will Doctrine].
61. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 513
(1980).
62. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610'P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee's discharge due to his refusal to participate
in employer's illegal price-cutting scheme held sufficient grounds to support cause
of action in tort against employer); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee's discharge for refusing to
perjure himself for employer's benefit violated very essence of California penal
statute proscribing such testimony); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (terminated employee had called employer's attention
to shortweighing procedures in violation of Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law
Div. 1978) (x-ray technician refused to follow orders to perform catheterizations
for which she was unlicensed). But see Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.
3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (employee could not establish prima facie case
that his termination after 32 years of service for refusing to promote illegal
"sweetheart deals" with unions violated any public policy against such deals; this
employee was, however, able to proceed on breach of contract theory).
63. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee fired
because she did not seek to be excused from jury duty); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (court recognized importance
of jury service to the legal process and emphasized that employees should not be
fired for serving). "Whistleblowing" by employees on illegal activities of employers
is considered fulfilling a public duty. See infra note 54 for a discussion of whis-
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a statutory right, such as filing a workman's compensation claim. 64
Some courts have taken a restrictive view, finding such terminations
to be mere violations of an employee's "private" interests. 65 Other
courts, however, have held that certain private interests encompassed
by the broad public policy exception are actionable. 66
tleblowing statutes and related cases. The refusal to violate a professional code of
ethics has also been described as fulfilling a public duty. See Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 75-76, 417 A.2d 505, 512-13 (1980). In Pierce,
a physician's refusal to continue research on a controversial drug did not amount
to a violation of a medical code of ethics, but if the physician had alleged that
the drug was dangerous, her subsequent dismissal would have violated public policy.
See id.
64. See, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1984)
(discharge of employee for seeking worker's compensation benefits violated public
policy); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (App. Div.
1980), afr'd, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (retaliatory discharge against
employee who files for worker's compensation benefits is unlawful). The most
conservative decisions do not permit any exception to the employment at will
doctrine. See Martin v. D.L. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (employee at will
not entitled to damages for wrongful discharge when terminated for applying for
workmen's compensation benefits); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.
2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (any common law tort action against employers for firing
employees who file for worker's compensation benefits must be created by legis-
lature). Approximately sixteen states, however, have enacted protective statutes
that prohibit retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1986); CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1986);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-342 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205 (West 1981); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (Smith-Hurd 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.197 (Supp.
1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon
Supp. 1987); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-6.19a (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 5 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-1-80 (Supp. 1986); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA.
CODE § 65.1-40.1 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985); Wis. STAT.
§ 102.35(2) (1973 & Supp. 1986). Other protected activities are usually union-related.
Employees have relied on state right-to-work statutes to protect their right to belong,
or not to belong, to unions or to enable them to participate freely in union activities
without fear of retaliatory discharge. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-7-35 (1986); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1302 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-202 (1976); IOWA CODE
§§ 731.3, 731.4 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-808 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 71-1-47 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.230-
613.300 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 34-01-14 (1980); S.C. CODE AN. § 41-7-30 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-
201 to -1-204 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-34-1 to -34-17 (1974); VA. CODE
§§ 40.1-60 to -62 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT.
§§ 111.06, 111.70(3)(a), 111.84(l)(a) (1974 & Supp. 1986). The greatest amount of
protection against unjust termination is derived from the anti-discrimination statutes
discussed supra note 13.
65. An employer's violation of an employee's purely private interest is not
actionable under the public policy exception. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharma-
cuetical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). The court "balanced" the
physician's need to abide by her ethical code with the employer's need to continue
research on a questionable product. Id. at 75-76, 417 A.2d at 514.
66. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974)
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This broad basis for the exception gives the courts great flexibility
in examining wrongful termination suits. 67 This flexibility, however,
sometimes produces inconsistent results. 68 One result of this incon-
sistency is that professional and managerial employees often prevail
in wrongful discharge actions. 69 Low-level, clerical employees seldom
prevail. 70 This ad hoc judgment may put a terminated employee at
the mercy of judicial opinion.7'
Approximately twelve states refuse to permit a public policy ex-
ception to the employment at will doctrine. 72 One of the arguments
against increased use of the public policy exception is that the burden
of excessive or frivolous litigation by employees against employers
(female employee wrongfully discharged for refusing her supervisor's sexual ad-
vances). In Monge, the New Hampshire court balanced the employee's need for
job security against the employer's interest in continuing his business with a minimum
of disruption, and ultimately held that the employee's discharge violated public
policy because termination motivated by bad faith, malice or retaliation is not in
the public interest. See id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551; see also Lucas v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (female employee could not be fired for
resisting employer's sexual advances); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (hospital employee's discharge for refusing
to bare her buttocks during a staff stage production held in violation of Arizona's
indecent exposure law and contrary to public morals).
67. Courts have great flexibility in examining wrongful termination suits. See
A Legislative Function, supra note 4, at 754-67.
68. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law
Div. 1978); cf. Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590
P.2d 513 (1978) (nurse's refusal to decrease her staff justified her termination,
despite fact that reduced staff could not meet intensive care ward's safety standards).
69. The Public Policy Exception, supra note 4, at 1936-49. The American labor
force is characterized as a primary market of employees in predominantly profes-
sional and managerial capacities in the upper tier and non-managerial white and
blue collar employees in the lower tier. See id. at 1939. The secondary market is
comprised of employees in low-wage, high-turnover jobs that are disproportionately
filled by women and minorities. See id. at 1938-40.
70. See id. at 1949.
71. See id.
72. The following states rigidly conform to the traditional employment at will
doctrine and permit few, if any, exceptions for terminations in violation of public
policy: Alabama, see Reich v. Holiday Inn, 454 So. 2d 982 (Ala. 1984); Colorado,
see, Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513
(1978) (Colorado Court of Appeals has expressly refused to recognize public policy
exception while reserving possibility of doing so in the future); District of Columbia,
see Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Georgia, see
Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978) (courts in
Georgia have continued to steadfastly reject any public policy exception); Iowa,
see Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Louisiana,
see Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp. 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 414 So.
2d 379 (La. 1982); Maine, see MacDonald v. Eastern Fine Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d
228 (Me. 1984); Mississippi, see Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d
874 (Miss. 1981); Nebraska, see Beaver Lake Ass'n v. Beaver Lake Corp., 200
Neb. 685, 264 N.W.2d 871 (1978); New York, see Murphy v. American Home
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will frustrate both the judicial and economic system.73 In Murphy
v. American Home Products Corp. ,"4 the New York Court of Appeals
refused to acknowledge the employee's discharge as wrongful, despite
the fact that he was terminated for reporting repeated accounting
improprieties to senior management.75 The court found the accounting
improprieties to be a "matter of judgment. ' 76 The court also char-
acterized the problem of retaliatory dismissal for employee conduct
that is protected by public policy as a problem best resolved by the
legislature .7 7
Partly in response to the court's decision, the legislature approved
the passage of the "Whistleblower Protection" bill, 78 which Governor
Cuomo signed into law on August 1, 1984. 79 The law protects both
private and public employees from retaliation for reporting a "vi-
olation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents
a substantial and specific danger to the public health or saftey." 80
The statute's narrow proscription against retaliatory discharge of
employees who report employer violations involving the public safety
does not protect employees who report employers' questionable or
illegal business practices.8 Several states have enacted legislation that
provides broader protection for employees who "blow the whistle"
on their employers.82
Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Ohio, see
Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 5 Ohio App. 3d 203, 451 N.E.2d 1236 (1982);
Wyoming, see Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985). While
Florida courts do not generally recognize a public policy exception to employment
at will, see DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980), courts will find a violation
of public policy if a worker is fired for filing a workman's compensation claim.
See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
73. See Finkin, supra note 2, at 732.
74. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
75. Id. at 297-98, 448 N.E.2d at 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
76. Id. at 300, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
77. Id. at 300-01, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
78. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney Supp. 1987); see also N.Y. Cirv.
SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp. 1987).
79. 1984 N.Y. Laws 660.
80. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see also N.Y. Crv.
SERV. LAW § 75-b(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
81. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d
86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (employee fired for reporting questionable accounting
practices by corporate officers).
82. California, for example, protects employees from wrongful discharge when
they disclose information to a governmental agency if the employee has reasonable
belief that the employer has violated a state or federal law or regulation. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1102.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1987). Another California statute protects
employees from retaliatory discharge if they assert their rights under the jurisdiction
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2. The Implied Employment Contract
Implied employment contracts that may protect employees against
arbitrary discharge are usually construed from employer represen-
tations of a specified length of employment or a "good cause"
standard for dismissal." The employment at will doctrine, however,
does not apply to employment contracts that expressly indicate that
employment will last for a specific length of time.14 Such express
contracts protect employees from premature dismissal unless the
breach was based upon legal excuse such as "good cause." 85
of the State Labor Commissioner. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 1971 & Supp.
1987). Connecticut statutes protect employees who report a suspected violation of
any federal, state or municipal law by their employers, and protect those employees
who are asked to testify before a public body in charge of such investigation. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (1983). In addition, Connecticut public service employees
are protected if they report illegal activities to the Department of Public Utility
Control. See 1985 Conn. Acts 85-245 (Reg. Sess.). Employees of the State of
Connecticut are given even greater protection because they can report corruption,
unethical practices, state law regulation violations, gross waste of funds, misman-
agement, abuse of authority, or danger to the public safety without fear of retaliatory
discharge. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6ldd (West Supp. 1986). Maine statutes
protect public and private employees if they either report a statutory violation, are
asked to participate in an investigation or refuse to carry out a command which
violates a state or federal law. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (Supp.
1987). Michigan statutes protect employees who report a violation of law or who
are asked to participate in an investigatory process. See MICH. ComP. LAws ANN.
§ 15.361-369 (West 1981).
83. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 3.04, at 3-10 to -19.
84. See id. § 3.01, at 3-2.
85. The term "good catise" has never been clearly defined-however, good cause
for termination has been found when employees are caught lying, see Rozier v.
St. -Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50 (1980); fighting, see Grozek
v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 858, 406 N.Y.S.2d 213 (4th Dep't 1978); destroying
employer's property, see Mead Johnson & Co. v. Oppenheimer, 458 N.E.2d 668
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); or are found to be incapable of performing their job. See
Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1974). An employer's
defense to an accusation of wrongful discharge is to assert a claim that the
termination was for good cause. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 9.02,
at 9-2 to -5. A question arises as to the determination of the employee's conduct
as sufficiently inappropriate to deserve discharge. See id. § 9.02, at 9-5 to -12.
Courts have expressed two views regarding this determination. First, a court may
consider the employer's good faith subjective determination of the employee's
conduct, which can result in unfair decisions, because the employer reaches the
final decision as to the severity of the employee's conduct. See, e.g., Simpson v.
Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (two employees accused
of making threats against other workers were investigated by employer and ultimately
discharged solely upon basis of investigation; court refused to independently de-
termine if threats were actually made). The second and fairer view is that the
decision to fire for good cause should be subjected to a certain level of judicial
scrutiny. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980). In Toussaint, the court advocated a review of conflicting facts by the
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Under the modern judicial approach, courts find that policies in
personnel handbooks and oral representations by employers can
create an implied-in-fact contract of employment.8 6 In addition, an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employer/employee
relationships can create an implied-in-law employment contract. 7
This creation of an implied contract of employment has enabled
employees to prevail in arbitrary discharge suits.88 Most courts,
trier of fact: "[wihere the employer alleges that the employee was discharged for
one reason-excessive tardiness-and the employee presents [conflicting] evidence
. . . the question also is one of fact for the jury. The jury is always permitted to
determine the employer's true reason for discharging the employee." Id. at 622,
292 N.W.2d at 896. See generally The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note
4 (in-depth introduction to contract of employment analysis).
86. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 3.04, at 3-10 to -19. Construction
of implied-in-fact contracts has also been determined by promissory estoppel when
employees have relied on promises of job security by taking and retaining a specific
job. See id. at 3-11. For a thorough analysis of the personnel handbook as contract
problem, see Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At- Will Contracts, 1985
DUKE L.J. 196 [hereinafter Employee Handbooks]. See generally Connolly, Mug
& Sharman, Abrogating the Employment-at- Will Doctrine: Implications for an
Employer's Personnel Policies and Handbooks, 2 PREVENTATIVE L. REP. 53-60
(1983); DeGiuseppe, Employee Rights, supra note 3, at 44-68; Note, Master and
Servant-Employment-at-Will-Personnel Manual One Factor of Totality of Cir-
cumstances to Create Contractual Right to Just Cause Dismissal, 14 SETON HALL
L. REv. 396 (1984).
87. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 3.05, at 3-19 to -25. "Implied-
in-law contracts, or quasi contracts . . . are conceptually on the borderline between
tort and contract, since they depend not on any agreement of the parties but on
the court's conception of what should have been part of [the] agreement." Id. at
3-19.
88. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980) (employee contended that employer's written personnel policies prohibited
discharge unless for cause); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn. 1983) (employer's failure to adhere to disciplinary procedures outlined in
handbook resulted in employee's termination without good cause); Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10,
499 A.2d 515 (1985); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d
441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (court articulated four-prong test in order to determine
breach of employment contract by employer when terminating an employee: in-
ducement to leave present job based upon assurance that termination would require
cause; assurance was incorporated into written employment manual; employee re-
jected other offers of potential employment; employer emphasized compliance with
specified termination procedures). But see, O'Connor v. Eastman Kodak Co., 65
N.Y.2d 724, 481 N.E.2d 549, 492 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1985) (employee could not rely
upon periodic evaluation procedure to establish employment contract); Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1983) (employee could not meet test articulated in Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443
N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (1982)); Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 98
A.D.2d 318, 470 N.Y.S.2d 599, aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 473 N.E.2d 11, 483 N.Y.2d
659 (1984) (employee failed to meet Weiner test); O'Donnell v. Westchester Comm.
Serv. Council, Inc., 96 A.D.2d 885, 466 N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d Dep't 1983) (same); Luisi
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however, refuse to infer such a contract without first examining the
totality of the circumstances in each case and applying an analytical
framework to those facts.89
Under the traditional view of personnel handbooks and other
written employment information, courts hold such books are "never
part of an employee contract, because they may be unilaterally
amended by the employer and ... the employee has not given
independent consideration for the promises they contain." 9 In ad-
dition, this view is enforced by the doctrine of mutuality, 9' although
in general courts no longer adhere to this doctrine. 92 In the states
v. JWT Group, Inc., 128 Misc. 2d 291, 488 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985) (no contract based upon employee handbook established unless substantial
reliance by employee upon entering into employment relationship).
89. In Weiner, the New York Court of Appeals articulated a four-prong test
to determine whether an express employment contract was created and if termination
of the employee constituted a breach of that contract. First, the employee must
rely upon the employer's promise not to discharge the employee except for cause
when employee entered employment or left his previous employer based upon this
reliance. See 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. Second,
the assurance given to the employee must be incorporated into a written employment
application (or handbook). See id. Third, the employee must have rejected other
offers of employment in reliance upon this assurance. See id. Finally, the court
required that the employer emphasize compliance with just cause termination
procedures, such as probation periods or impartial hearings. See id. If these four
requirements are not met, the employee cannot sue for unjust dismissal based upon
an implied or express employment contract. Therefore, in Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983),
the New York Court of Appeals rejected Murphy's contention of an implied "just
cause" provision for discharge in his employment handbook, because an "express
limitation" is neededon the employer's right to termination. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305,
448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983). Murphy's claim did not fulfill
the strict Weiner test and failed to prove a breach of an implied employment
contract. See id. at 305, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
90. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 8.02, at 8-3. The Michigan
Supreme Court, however, has stated that when employers announce a personnel
policy "presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee
attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the workforce, the employer may
not treat its [policy] as illusory." Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at
895. Inadequacy of consideration is another traditional argument against enforcing
handbook promises because the employment contract existed when the.employee
provided his labor and services in consideration for the salary paid by the employer.
See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 351-
52 (1974). Additional consideration was required for the employer to be bound by
his additional promises. See id.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1980). Mutuality of ob-
ligation is not required for an enforceable contract as long as there is adequate
consideration. See id. The fact that an employee may quit at any time does not
adversely affect an employer's promise not to terminate unless for cause. See Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
92. See id. at 629. In Pine River, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
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that adhere to the traditional contract analysis of employee hand-
books, 93 courts find such statements by employers to be broad
an employer's promises of job security in its handbook could not be defeated
because of a lack of mutuality, 333 N.W.2d at 629. The court stated that "[tihe
demand for mutuality of obligation, although appealing in its symmetry, is simply
a species of the forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of consideration . . . ." Id.
at 629. The court reiterated its holding in an earlier case that "the concept of
mutuality in contract law has been widely discredited and the right of one party
to terminate a contract at will does not invalidate the contract." Id. (citing Cardinal
Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, 297 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn. 1980)); see J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-22 (2d ed. 1977) (stating
that one consideration, such as employee's promised service, may support several
promises, such as employer's promise of salary, bonuses, or other fringe benefits).
The doctrines of mutuality and adequacy of consideration are considered rules of
construction, not of substance, when determining the rights of the parties. See
Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
93. States which uphold the traditional analysis of employee handbooks and
do not include these manuals in employment contract analysis are: Alabama, see
White v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983) (employee handbooks
do not become employment contracts upon dissemination and receipt); Delaware,
see Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982) (employee
handbook represents expression of company policy); Florida, see Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (employer's merit review
policies did not establish implied contract) (but see Falls v. Lawnwood Medical
Center, 427 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (personnel policies could be
part of employment contract)); Georgia, see Buice v. Gulf Oil Corp., 172 Ga.
App. 93, 322 S.E.2d 103 (1984) (employer's policy of rehabilitating alcoholics did
not protect terminated employee who suffered from alcoholism); Idaho, see MacNeil
v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985) (employee fired
after only receiving oral warning was not protected from discharge by employer's
policy of issuing written warnings before termination) (MacNeil appears to be
reversing earlier trend permitting expansive reading of employee handbooks as
contracts, see Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977)); Indiana, see Mead Johnson & Co. v. Oppenheimer, 458 N.E.2d 668 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984) (no implied contract of employment even when employee handbook
outlined termination procedures); Kansas, see Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) (no implied contract of employment
established by handbook policy of no termination unless for cause); Louisiana, see
Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (employer not
bound to follow termination proceedings outlined in policy); Mississippi, see Shaw
v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1985) (employment contract which expressly
established ground rules for termination could not be modified by informal policies);
Montana, see Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063
(Mont. 1982) (employee handbook distributed two years after commencement of
employment could not have been bargained for and thus was unilateral statement
of policy); New York, see Murphy v. American Home Prods., Corp., 58 N.Y.2d
293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (court stated that handbook provisions
created no implied contract of employment but could be analyzed to determine
whether express contract existed between the parties); North Carolina, see Griffin
v. Housing Auth. 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200 (1983) (personnel policies
are unilaterally adopted by the employer and are not part of any employment
contract); Tennessee, see Graves v. Anchor Wire Corp., 692 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn.
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statements of policy, 94 not promises upon which the employee may
rely. 9 In addition, the employer can disavow any of the apparent
promises in such employee literature by publishing a prominent
disclaimer with the material. 96 The disclaimer reaffirms the employer's
ability to terminate at will, despite any apparent statements to the
contrary in the handbook. 97
Ct. App. 1985) (employee handbooks do not provide sufficient guarantees to
constitute employment contracts for other than indefinite term); Texas, see Molder
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (employee
handbooks are nothing more than guidelines; handbooks do not limit employer's
right to fire at will); Wisconsin, see Ferraro v. Koelsch, 119 Wis. 2d 407, 350
N.W.2d 735 (Wis. Ct. App.), aff'd, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1984)
(employment manual did not create implied contract of employment because em-
ployee signed disclaimer and did not give additional consideration for employer's
promises).
94. See Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779
(1976). In Johnson, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he manual was not published until long after plaintiff's employment.
It was only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures.
Its terms were not bargained for by the parties and any benefits conferred
by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the minds was
evidenced by the defendant's unilateral act of publishing company policy.
Id. at 52, 551 P.2d at 782.
95. Such specific employer promises, however, may induce a prospective em-
ployee to accept an initial employment offer or may induce better production or
improved employee attitudes. See, e.g., Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d
at 894-95.
96. An employer's prominent disclaimer as to any modification of the traditional
employment at will doctrine is a "protection" that is becoming more popular.
See Wall St. J., July 30, 1985, at 1, col. 5 (Labor Letter). Such a disclaimer would
read as follows:
The Company retains the right to change, modify, suspend, interpret or
cancel in whole or in part any of the published or unpublished personnel
policies or practices of the Company, without advance notice, in its sole
discretion, without having to give cause or justification or consideration
to any employee. Recognition of these rights and prerogatives of the
Company is a term and condition of employment and of continued
employment.
Reservation of Management Rights Provisions, Termination of Employment (P-H)
50,502 (1984). Another type of disclaimer appears on employment applications
which prospective employees sign. In Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F.
Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held that the employer's statement on its application that
"employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause, and
with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or [the
employee] . . ." rendered its personnel handbook impotent to modify an at-will
arrangement. 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
97. The predominant claim asserted by terminated employees is not that their
employment was "permanent" but that their employer did not follow termination
procedures outlined in the handbook such as probationary periods, serial warnings
or impartial hearings. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Comm. Hosp., 141 Ariz.
544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct.
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Some courts, however, have considered all the circumstances and
acts of the parties in order to establish whether something other
than the traditional terminable at-will relationship existed."8 This
modern approach questions whether "a reasonable person looking
at the objective manifestations of the parties' intent [would] find
that they had intended this obligation to be part of the contract." 99
The employee's receipt of the literature or acknowledgement of an
oral assurance need not come directly at the outset of employment.1 °°
The employee's continued employment is sufficient consideration to
support later promises of job security. 01 General policy statements,
however, do not confer additional rights.10 2
In Finley v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 03 for example, the
Connecticut Supreme Court decided a case involving the alleged
wrongful termination of a man who had worked for twenty-four
years with the Aetna Life & Casualty Company."' The plaintiff had
received mostly favorable evaluations over the course of his em-
App. 1984); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Thomp-
son v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
98. The courts frequently proceed on a unilateral contract analysis and find an
offer, acceptance and consideration sufficient to support an employer's promise
for something more than an at-will arrangement. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 301-04, 491 A.2d 1257, 1266-68, modified, 101 N.J. 10,
499 A.2d 515 (1985) (discussed infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text). See
generally Note, Employee Handbooks, supra note 86, at 213-20.
99. LARSON & BOROWS IY, supra note 3, § 8.02, at 8-4. Indeed, courts have
noted that the employment at will presumption does not prevent the parties from
contracting some other form of employment relationship. See Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983).
100. The Michigan Supreme Court has noted that an employer creates a situation
'instinct with an obligation' " of fair and consistent application when it issues
an employee handbook, regardless of when the employee actually becomes aware
of the policies explained therein. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at
892 (citation omitted); see also Employee Handbooks, supra note 86, at 210.
101. Courts have stated that the requirement of independent consideration for
an employer's later -promise of job security is more a rule of construction than
of substance. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920 (1981); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
102. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that as a matter of contract law,
"[an employer's general statements of policy are no more than that and do not
meet the contractual requirements for an offer." Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d
at 626.
103. 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64 (1985), rev'd, 202 Conn. 190, 520 A.2d
208 (1987). The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the Connecticut Appellate
Court's decision ordering a new trial for the plaintiff and reinstated the jury verdict
for the defendant employer under the general verdict rule. See 202 Conn. at 194,
520 A.2d at 211.
104. 202 Conn. at 192, 520 A.2d at 210.
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ployment. 105 In addition, because of Aetna's personnel manual and
several oral promises, the plaintiff believed that he could not be
discharged except for cause. 1°6 Furthermore, Finley had relied to his
detriment upon his employer's promises by turning down other
potentially lucrative job offers. 07 Nevertheless, after a dispute among
personnel in Finley's department, Finley's supervisor fired him. 108
The Connecticut Supreme Court first analyzed the appellate court's
decision of whether the statute of frauds' °9 applied to employment
contracts for an indefinite term." 0 These contracts did not need the
signed, written agreement specified in the statute because they could
be completed within one year if the employee died or became
disabled."' The court held that the appellate court did not abuse
its discretion in finding error in the trial court's exclusion of later
oral promises and conversations as possible affirmations of the
employer's policy statements."12 These policy statements asserted that
involuntary terminations would occur only when employees failed
to perform satisfactorily, keep good attendance or were otherwise
unsuited for their job."3 The appellate court had held that "[t]he
plaintiff was entitled to have the jury determine, from this evidence,
whether there was an agreement that the plaintiff would not be
terminated without just cause ...and whether that agreement was
breached."" 4
The Connecticut Supreme Court next considered whether repre-
sentations in an employer's personnel manual may give rise to an
express or implied contract and limit the employer's right to discharge
an otherwise at-will employee." 5 The court stated that "statements
in the defendant's personnel manual were of critical importance to
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 193, 520 A.2d at 210.
108. See id. at 192-93, 520 A.2d at 210.
109. See 5 Conn. App. at 398-402, 499 A.2d at 68-70. The Connecticut statute
of frauds requires a signed, written agreement to enforce any contract that cannot
be performed within one year. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-550 (Supp. 1986).
110. See 202 Conn. at 196-98, 520 A.2d at 212-13. The appellate court had found
reversible error in the trial court's exclusion of oral statements concerning the
alleged employment contract. See 5 Conn. App. at 398, 499 A.2d at 68-69.
111. See 202 Conn. at 197-98, 520 A.2d at 212-13.
112. See id. at 198, 520 A.2d at 213; see also 5 Conn. App. at 399-400, 499
A.2d at 69-70.
113. See 5 Conn. App. at 401, 499 A.2d at 70.
114. See id. at 402, 499 A.2d at 70 (citations omitted).
115. See 202 Conn. at 198-201, 520 A.2d at 213-15. The court agreed with the
appellate court that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury that an
employment manual cannot form the basis of an employment contract. See id.
19871
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
the issue of whether an express contract existed between the defendant
and the plaintiff.""' 6 The court held that "whether the defendant's
personnel manual gave rise to an express contract between the parties
was a question of fact properly to be determined by a jury ' 1 7 and
should not have been excluded by the trial court."' The court also
emphasized that employers could protect themselves from wrongful
discharge claims based upon breach of contract by "eschewing lan-
guage that could reasonably be construed as a basis for a contractual
promise, or by including appropriate disclaimers of the intention to
contract .... ,"' Under the general verdict rule,' 20 however, the court
reinstated the jury verdict for the defendant despite the erroneous
instruction because the court presumed that the verdict encompassed
a finding that Aetna's termination of Finley was justified by evidence
of unsatisfactory job performance. 2'
In Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. ,22 the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered a factual scenario similar to that in Finley. The
plaintiff, hired as an engineering manager, had worked for nine
years, with two promotions.' 23 After his sudden termination, he
asserted that he could be fired only for cause, in accordance with
procedures specified in Hoffman-La Roche's personnel handbook. 2 4
The court emphasized the question of whether "the legal effect of
the dissemination of a personal policy manual ... [should] be
determined solely . . . by traditional contract doctrine."' 25
The court then applied a unilateral contract analysis and determined
that the defendant had made an offer of job security in the manual,
116. Id. at 199, 520 A.2d at 213.
117. See id. at 199, 520 A.2d at 213-14.
118. See id. at 199, 520 A.2d at 214.
119. See id. at 199 n.5, 520 A.2d at 214 n.5; see also D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of
Directors, 202 Conn. 206, 214 (1987) (employer negligently misrepresented notice of
general rehiring to employee).
120. See 202 Conn. at 202, 520 A.2d at 215. The general verdict rule provides
that if a jury renders a general verdict, absent a request for interrogatories, an
appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing
party. See id.
121. See id. at 202, 520 A.2d at 215.
122. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d at 515 (1985).
123. See id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
124. See id. at 287, 491 A.2d at 1258. The policy manual defined the grounds
for involuntary discharge: 1) layoff, caused by lack of work; 2) retirement; 3)
resignation (voluntary on the initiative of the employee); 4) discharge due to
performance, complete with a detailed procedure; and 5) disciplinary discharge. See
id. at 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.2. There was no category for termination without
cause. See id.
125. Id. at 289-90, 491 A.2d at 1260.
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and that the employee had accepted it.126 The employee, furthermore,
had supported his acceptance with the consideration of his continued
employment.' 27 The defendant's statements, according to the court,
appeared to make "a commitment that gave workers protection
against arbitrary termination." 2 '
The court recognized that a prominent disclaimer would insure the
employer's unfettered right to terminate at will.129 The court, however,
stated, "[t]he interests of employees, employers and the public
lead to the conclusion that the common law of New Jersey should
limit the right of an employer to fire an employee at will."' 130
In Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,' the Second Circuit
considered whether an employer's oral promise of lifetime employ-
ment adequately protected a "star" sales manager from later arbitrary
discharge. 132 An Avis general manager induced the plaintiff to relocate
from San Francisco to the Northeast with the promise that the
plaintiff's future was secure with the company, as long as he refrained
from major transgressions.' 33 The general manager also assured Ohan-
ian that he could move back to California if the new job was
unsuccessful. 34 The plaintiff later signed a form, which included
language stating that employment with Avis was terminable at will
and that any modification had to be in writing and signed by an
executive officer. 135
After his termination, Ohanian initiated suit for wrongful discharge
in violation of his oral contract. 136 The court rejected the defendant's
arguments that the contract was unenforceable because it was oral
and thus violated the statute of frauds.' 37 The court determined that the
126. See id. at 302-04, 491 A.2d at 1266-68.
127. See id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267. Consideration, or value, must be given
in exchange for the employer's offer in order to convert that offer into a binding
agreement. See id. at 301, 491 A.2d at 1266.
128. Id. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266.
129. See id. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
130. Id. at 291, 491 A.2d at 1261 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 511 (1980)). The court also emphasized fairness:
"[A]II that this opinion requires of an employer is that it be fair. It would be
unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce
believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to
renege on those promises." Id. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
131. 77 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (interpreting New York law).
132. See id. at 103.
133. See id. at 104.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 105-08. The New York statute of frauds requires a signed writing
19871
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
oral contract could have been terminated within one year and did
not fall under the statute.'38 In addition, the court also rejected the
argument that the signed form that asserted employment at will
barred any inclusion of parol evidence139 to establish the intent of
the parties.'40 The court upheld the jury's finding that such a state-
ment was not the type usually found on such forms and that plaintiff
Ohanian did not intend to be bound by his signature. 141 Finally, the
court held that the plaintiff's relocation from San Francisco to New
York adequately supported his employer's promise of lifetime em-
ployment. 142
3. Abusive Discharge Actions
The creation of the tort of abusive discharge143 represents the most
revolutionary theory advanced by employees in wrongful termination
suits. 144 This theory, if consistently followed, would permanently
retire the employment at will doctrine to the annals of legal history. 145
An argument against any expansion of this theory is that a workforce
that enjoys such protection will abuse it, become lazy and complacent
and find ways to lower productivity down to but not quite meeting
to enforce contracts that cannot be performed within one year. See N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(1) (McKinney 1986).
138. See 779 F.2d at 108.
139. See id. at 108-09. The parol evidence rule is a fundamental principle of
contract law that prohibits any written agreement between the parties to be changed
by oral evidence. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See LRsoN & BOROWSKY, supra note 4, § 4.02, at 4-2 to -10.
144. See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976)
(manager wrongfully terminated waitress when he arbitrarily began firing his staff
in alphabetical order).
145. Professor Summers states:
[Jiudicial acceptance of the employment at will doctrine effectively elim-
inated for most workers all rights as to the future from the contract of
employment, and thereby drained it of all substantial content .... When
employment is at will, contractual rights and duties largely disappear or
become empty shells, for rights and duties arising out of continuing
relationship can have little substance when either party can terminate the
relationship at any moment for no reason.
The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note 4, at 1085. The historical development
of employment at will from Wood's rule met the needs of a developing American
industrial economy. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. Yet, modern
conceptions of fairness and equality require legal inquiry into the viability of
this doctrine. It is mere rationalization to assert that workers will by nature bear
the "inequalities of fortune," supra note 45, during the employment relationship.
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the standards set for a "just cause" for termination stipulation.146
The tort of abusive discharge is an amalgam of theories advanced
under the public policy exception.1 47 The tort can be "based upon
a finding that the discharge was motivated by malice, bad faith, or
retaliation. 1 1 48 At least one state has held that a discharge motivated
by malicious intent to harm the employee is, in itself, a violation
of public policy. 49 No forthright public policy protection, however,
ensures security and fair treatment in employment. 50 Yet, "tort law
is entirely concerned with public policy-the policy that individuals
be secure in their person and belongings."'' The adoption of tort
law concepts to treatment of employees appears fair, given the special
power of intimidation of employers' and the complete dependence
of the employee on his wages.' Successful actions in tort, however,
would expose employers to risks involving punitive damages. 5 4
Abusive discharge may include the tort action of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.' Courts, however, are reluctant to act
on an employee's accusations unless the employer's conduct exceeds
146. Certain "good cause" for termination would include unsatisfactory per-
formance or incapacity to perform the job, product discontinuance or permanent
work stoppage. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Employees, however,
could perform the least amount of work required to complete the task in order
to avoid triggering a "good cause" termination standard.
147. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 4, § 4.02, at 4-2.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. In Pennsylvania, two courts have held that such a discharge violates public
policy, although the employees were not able to proceed successfully in wrongful
discharge suits due to other factors. See Boresen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 F.
Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984); see also McNulty
v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (plaintiff successfully proved
that his discharge was motivated by specific intent to harm him). This "bad faith"
termination exception to employment at will is "a broader basis of liability than
the 'public policy' exception. In its pure form, the focus would be entirely on the
wrong done to the employee himself and not on any particular public policy."
LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 4, § 4.02, at 4-4. The tort of abusive discharge
was first indicated in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d
174 (1974). See Public Policy Limitations to the Employment-At- Will Doctrine,
supra note 60, at 1121-22.
151. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 4.02, at 4-4.
152. Employees are inescapably vulnerable to economic forces and are vulnerable
to employer abuse, given the inequality of the parties and the power an employer
has over the employee's livelihood. See The Rights of Individual Workers, supra
note 4, at 1106.
153. See id.
154. See Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees.
26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 449 (1985) (hereinafter Punitive Damages).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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"all bounds usually tolerated by decent society .... ,"16 The dif-
ficulty arises when the employer's conduct during the termination
process is offensive and outrageous but does not meet the requirement
of being so outrageous as to exceed society's tolerance.' 5 7 The em-
ployee must then rely upon judicial consideration of the specific
facts of the discharge. "' Another difficult situation occurs when the
employer's conduct involves racial or sexual harassment; the em-
ployee's common-law action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress may then be preempted by statutory prohibition of such
discriminatory action.15 9
Other tort actions brought by employees include fraud, 60 inten-
156. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 12, at 60 (5th ed. 1984).
157. The rule set forth in the Second Restatement of Torts states: "One who
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for emotional distress .... " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). A comment to the section states that liability
is to be found where the conduct is "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." Id. § 46 comment d. An employee who claimed she was subjected
to threats and insults was found not to have met the requirement. See Cushing v.
General Time Corp., 549 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (employee threatened with
termination, charged with spreading malicious gossip, and personally insulted did
not have a cause of action for emotional distress under Alabama tort law); cf.
Rice v. United Ins. 465 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 1984) (employee's miscarriage due to
employer harrassment held sufficient to prove intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
158. In Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1970), the California Supreme Court determined that the court must
decide if the conduct may reasonably be thought of as so atrocious as to allow
recovery and, where reasonable people may differ, the court may submit the question
to the jury, subject to the guidance of the court. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499, 468 P.2d
216, 219, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (1970).
159. Sexual harassment of an employee by an employer is grounds to bring an
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in federal court for sex
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1982). A Title VII claim, however, usually
does not supplant common law causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, although it might pre-empt an action for wrongful discharge. See Shaffer
v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that while
employee's claim for wrongful discharge was dismissed under invocation of Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress nonetheless survived). In Shaffer, the court stated that the purpose underlying
the anti-discrimination statute at issue was to eradicate past practices of discrim-
ination but that the tort of outrage protects the individual against intentionally
inflicted mental anguish, whatever its source. 565 F. Supp. 909, 914 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
160. See, e.g., Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (terminated employee proved fraud because his employer had told him that
he was " 'here to stay' " and that the company "take[s] care of [their] permanent
executives").
[Vol. XV
EMPLO YEES A T WILL
tional interference with contract,' 6' prima facie tort 62 and negli-
gence.1 63 The fundamental argument against further expansion of
abusive discharge and its related tort actions is that any such ex-
pansion should be decided by the legislature.' 64 In addition, recovery
in tort with the possibility of punitive damages would severely increase
the potential burden on employees in planning for such liability. 65
4. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a concept
that exists in most commercial contracts. 16 6 This covenant assumes
that neither party to an agreement will interfere with the other
party's right to receive the benefit of the bargain. 67 An express
employment contract specifying the length of the hiring or the terms
of compensation usually is presumed to contain such a covenant. 6
161. See, e.g., Powers v. Delnor Hosp.,. 481 N.E.2d 968 (I11. Ct. App. 1985)
(employer could be found liable for deliberately lying about reason for employee's
termination to prospective employer); cf. Covell v. Spengler, 141 Mich. App. 76,
366 N.W.2d 76 (1985) (employer cannot be held liable for interfering with employee's
existing "contract" because employer is party to contract).
162. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303-
04, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90-92, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236-37 (1983) (plaintiff's assertion
of prima facie tort failed to emphasize absence of social or economic justification
for discharge or prove malice sufficiently; consequently, court would not permit
plaintiff to "bootstrap" himself due to unavailability of wrongful discharge tort).
163. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Bissell Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich.
1982) (employer held liable for negligently conducting performance review resulting
in employee being discharged).
164. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 301-
02, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235-36 (1983). The New York Court
of Appeals stated that the legislative branch possessed "infinitely greater resources
and procedural means to discern the public will, to examine . . . [s]tandards ...
applicable to the multifarious types of employment and the various circumstances
of discharge." Id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
1'65. See Punitive Damages, supra note 154, at 472-96; see also Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983). In Brockmeyer, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court emphasized that wrongful discharge awards should be limited to
reinstatement and back pay, which are traditional contractual remedies, because
those damages are foreseeable and open to possible mitigation. See id. at 841.
166. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
167. Id. See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty
to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980) (hereinafter Breach of
Contract).
168. The collective bargaining agreement creates "legally enforceable contract
rights in the individual. One function ... was to give life and meaning to the
individual contract of employment." The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note
4, at 1088. "If the contract is ambiguous, or the facts are in dispute, the union
is entitled to resolve the ambiguity and to make a reasoned judgment of the facts
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But an at-will employee traditionally has no such contractual rights
and receives no protection from the presumption. 169
The distinction between a contract action for breach of the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing and a tort action for abusive
discharge based upon malice is blurred. 170 One could describe the
breach of this covenant as a violation of public policy, and thus
characterize the action as a tort.'7' Characterizing the action as a
tort opens up the possibility of punitive damages.1
72
The California Supreme Court has stated that there is "an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither
party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement.' ' 7  In Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc. , 4 the plaintiff, because his employer had suddenly
terminated him after eighteen years of service, brought suit for
* * **The union's advocacy of that result fulfills its duty to enforce the contract
rights of those it represents." Id. at 1096. The unionized employee, therefore,
enjoys a broader interpretation of his rights under an express bargaining agreement.
See, e.g., Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785, 605
P.2d 963 (1980).
169. All that an employee at will can hope for, absent express limitations on
his employer's termination right, is for a court to broadly construe the implied
good faith covenant based upon his-years of service, and his reliance on employer's
assurances and other quasi-contractual manifestations. See Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (employer estopped
from firing employee without good cause after eighteen years of satisfactory service);
see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981) (employee terminated after thirty-two years of service in violation of em-
ployer's implied promise of fair dealing). Professor Summers stated:
[T]he implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing must play a
central role in contracts of employment. The contract establishes a con-
tinuing relationship that requires a substantial measure of mutual trust
and confidence. Spelling out all of the terms in advance is impossible,
for the relationship changes, often in an evolutionary process that reshapes
rights and duties without explicit recognition . . . . The parties must
rely on the implicit understanding that each will show respect for the
other's interests ....
The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note 4, at 1106.
170. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 4.02, at 4-9.
171. If the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is presumed in every
express and implied contract, a public policy presumption is also raised that this
good faith requirement is to be encouraged between all contracting parties. See
Breach of Contract, supra note 167, at 386-87.
172. A breach of the implied covenant would violate public policy and could
create a cause of action in tort for actual and punitive damages. See Punitive
Damages, supra note 154, at 472-96.
173. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958).
174. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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compensation and punitive damages. 75 The California Court of Ap-
peals held that a breach of this implied covenant sounds in both
contract and tort and awarded both contractual and punitive dam-
ages. 176 The court in Cleary relied on analysis originated by the
California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 177
and stated that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
"unconditional and independent in nature,"'' 7 and should be rec-
ognized because "certain ... rights to job security [are] necessary
to ensure social stability in our society.' ' 79 Two important factors
in the court's decision were: (1) the length of the employee's service,
and (2) the fact that the employer had violated the express termination
procedures outlined by company policy.'80
In a later decision, however, the court decided in favor of a
terminated employee who had worked for his employer for thirty-
two years, and did not require the employee to prove that the
employer violated a termination procedure.'81 Five states have applied
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment
relationships.8
2
III. Models of Resolution
The inherent problem in developing models of resolution for the
employment at will controversy is the conflict between economic
175. Id. at 446-47, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 723-24.
176. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
177. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174-75, 610 P.2d 1330, 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843
(1980). The Tameny court noted that "California decisions ... have long recognized
that a wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual relationship may
afford both tort and contractual relief .... ." Id. at 174-75, 610 P.2d at 1334,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 843; see also Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 307-15, 448 N.E.2d 86, 93-97, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 239-43 (Meyers, J.,
dissenting) (1983).
178. Cleary, III Cal. App. 3d at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
179. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
180. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court held that "longevity of the
employee's service, together with the expressed policy of the employer, operate as
a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such an employee by the employer
without good cause." Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
181. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 328-29, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 927 (1981); see also Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (employee must allege longevity of
service and other personnel policies to prove implied covenant of good faith exists).
182. The following state courts have found an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts: Alaska, see Mitford v. de Lasala, 666
P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); California, see Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., III
Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Connecticut, see Cook
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efficiency and the expansion of employees' rights. I"3 Employers are
in business to make a profit, which entails the consumption of
resources, the sale of goods or services and the accumulation of
capital.'8 4 For employers, workers' output is a resource that they
must manage efficiently in order to maximize profit levels.'8 5 The
needs of employees for greater job security and freedom from ar-
bitrary treatment appear to conflict directly with this efficiency
theory.
A. Unionization as a Remedy
Professor Stieber, professor of economics and director at the School
of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University, has
stated that:
In principle there is widespread agreement that the employment-
at-will doctrine has no economic or moral justification in a modern
industrialized Nation. The idea that there is equity in a rule under
which the individual employee and the employer have the same
right to terminate an employment relationship at will is obviously
fictional in a society in which most workers are dependent upon
employers for their livelihood. 8 6
A solution to this problem is to encourage employees at will who
want protection from unjust termination to organize and form a
union.8 7 Although most collective bargaining agreements are express
employment contracts with protection against arbitrary discharge,'
and incorporate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,8 9
a difficulty arises when workers cannot achieve a fifty-one percent
majority vote needed to unionize. '9 In addition, the continued decline
in the number of employees who have joined unions reveals the
illusory aspect of this solution.' 9'
v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 40 Conn. 246, 488 A.2d 1295 (1985); Massachusetts,
see McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 471 N.E.2d 47
(1984); Montana, see Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont.
1984).
183. See generally Feinman, supra note 27, at 132-33.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Stieber, supra note 2, at 36.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 143-65 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 166-82.and accompanying text.
190. Stieber, supra note 2, at 36. Under the National Labor Relations Act, a
failure to achieve this 51% majority vote leaves 100%7o of the workforce vulnerable
to unjust discharge. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
191. Stieber, supra note 2, at 36-37; Finkin, supra note 2, at 727.
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B. Judicial Decree as a Progressive Solution
Inconsistent judicial response to wrongful discharge litigation has
created a patchwork of decisions across the country. 92 The degree
of responsiveness varies from the rigid affirmation of traditional at-
will principles 93 to the broad expansion of an implied good faith
covenant in most long-term employment relationships. 94 An em-
ployee's rights in a wrongful discharge case are therefore predeter-
mined by the trend in the law of her workplace or residence. 95
Indeed, some courts have retreated from a previously progressive
position to a reaffirmation of employment at will. 96 Judicial bal-
ancing of an employer/employee controversy may be subjectively
colored by the heavy weight of precedent the employment at will
doctrine bears and by the fact that policy considerations in fa-
vor of maintaining an attractive environment for businesses out-
weigh the rights of a single employee.197 Judicial balancing, however,
should analyze the totality of the circumstances in an unjust dismissal
case in which the employer asserts disclaimers as an absolute de-
192. See The Public Policy Exception, supra note 4, at 1950.
193. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
194. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1981); see also supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
195. Professor Blades states that while the employer's right to fire an at-will
employee is lawful, "the law should not allow the employer to exercise his right
of discharge in order to effectuate a purpose ulterior to that for which the right
was designed." Blades, supra note 4, at 1424. Blades also stated that questions of
the possibility of employee mobility should also be addressed because "the employee
who has enough mobility to avoid the consequences of his discharge will also have
enough mobility to make him an unlikely target for oppression by the employer.
But where the employee's experience is of special value only in his present em-
ployment . . . he is more susceptible to improper exertion of the employer's power
... ." Id. at 1426.
196. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d
86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (employer's unfettered right to terminate at will
sustained absent constitutional violation, statutory proscription or express contractual
limitation); cf. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (four-part test for determining employment contract).
197. The balance of power is intrinsically weighted in favor of the employer at
the outset of an employment at will relationship:
The owner of capital-the employer-and the non-owner of capital-
the employee-enter into a wage bargain by which the employer becomes
entitled to the worker's labor . . . the benefit to the worker is that wage
labor is his sole source of subsistence .... The [employment at will] rule
transformed long-term and semi-permanent relationships into non-binding
agreements . . . [i]f employees could be dismissed on a moment's notice,
obviously they could not claim a voice in the determination of the
conditions of work or the use of the product of their labor.
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fense. 9 Disclaimers that employers prominently place in employment
applications and personnel manuals should be signed by employees
and by employers in order to assure that the employee is aware of
her employer's policies.' 99 Yet, disclaimers merely provide one factor
in the analysis of a wrongful discharge case and should be balanced
carefully against other manifestations by the employer of potential
job security.200 In addition, courts may analyze these disclaimers as
contracts of adhesion. 20 1
C. Voluntary Action by Individual Employers as a Remedy
The American Arbitration Association advocates voluntary action
by employers to provide due process202 for discharged employees. 203
This solution is an alternative solution to compulsory labor-man-
agement relations. 2°4 Voluntary action on the record, however, "pro-
vides little basis for optimism."2 5 Most nonunion employees hesitate to
Feinman, supra note 27, at 132-33; see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 469, 443 N.E.2d 441, 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 199 (1982) ("[a] less sa-
vory result of imposing additional restrictions on the ability to discharge an
employee . . , is that businesses and industry, the major employers in New York
will simply move elsewhere") (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
198. See Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(while plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge was dismissed, court analyzed dis-
claimers on three separate employment agreements and found disclaimers silent as
to good cause for termination); see Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F.
Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (disclaimer that included provisions for termination
with or without cause at any time prevented employee from suing for wrongful
discharge).
199. See Decker, Handbooks And Employment Policies As Express Or Implied
Guarantees Of Employment-Employer Beware. 5 J. L. & COM. 207, 220-21, 26
[hereinafter Decker].
200. See Arie v. Interthem, 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1983); Schipani v. Ford Motor
Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
201. See Decker, supra note 199, at 222. Disclaimers may be "invalid because
of the disparity in bargaining power between the employer and employee .... As
the at-will employment doctrine is subjected to closer scrutiny, employers should
anticipate that disclaimers may be questioned as exhibiting this inequality in bar-
gaining power between employer and employee." Id.
202. Due process of law for at-will employees involves protection against arbitrary,
capricious, unfair and discriminatory discharge, see Howlett, Due Process for
Nonunionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, 32ND ANNUMA PROCEEDINGS, IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASs'N 164 (1979) [hereinafter Howlett].
203. Stieber, supra note 2, at 37. See generally Robins, Unfair Dismissal: Emerging
Issues In The Use Of Arbitration As A Dispute Resolution Alternative For The
Non-Union Workforce, 12 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 437 (1984) (an analysis of the
mechanics of the arbitration process as applied towards nonorganized workers)
[hereinafter Robins).
204. See id. at 441-44.
205. Stieber, supra note 2, at 37.
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use internal complaint procedures and rarely appeal unfavorable
decisions .206 Employers may, however, benefit from progressive dis-
ciplinary and termination procedures because of improved worker
morale.2"7 Many employers forgo the opportunity to develop fair,
binding internal complaint procedures and instead choose to rely
upon disclaimers in all personnel documents. 208 These disclaimers,
however, may be rendered unconscionable in an analogy to contracts
of adhesion decisions. 2°9 In addition, employees may not realize the
full import of written disclaimers upon their rights.2 10 The extra
effort and foresight of progressive companies in the development
of fairer policies, including binding review panels for termination
disputes, should reduce the likelihood of potential lawsuits and
improve profitability with the development of a loyal, informed
workforce. 211
D. Legislation as a Viable Solution
As noted in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp. ,212 leg-
islative bodies are better equipped than the courts to grapple with
the employment at will issue. 213 Some commentators advocate the
adoption of comprehensive federal legislation to protect employees
at will from unjust discharge. 214 Other commentators have proposed
legislative reform on the state level. 215 These statutory solutions
206. See CONFERENCE BOARD, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS: A CORPORATE
APPRAISAL (1980).
207. See BRADY, supra note 5, at 59-69.
208. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
209. See The Rights of Individual Workers, supra note 4, at 1106-7. Contracts
of adhesion are rarely bargained for between equals; in employment situations, the
employer "dictates the terms and reserves wide latitude in changing those terms
as the employment continues." Id. at 1106.
210. See id. at 1107. Moreover, "[tihe potential for overreaching [by the employer]
is pervasive and ever present; the law here, as in consumer contracts, has a
responsibility to protect the weaker party." Id.
211. See Robins, supra note 203, at 446-57.
212. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1983).
213. Id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
214. See Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for
a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 336-41 (1983) (hereinafter The Need
for a Federal Statute).
215. See Bellace, supra note 56, at 231-47; Howlett, supra note 202, at 166-70;
Time for a Statute, supra note 4, at 519-32. Professor Summers stated, "[Any
realistic hope for increased legal protection of employees must look for fulfillment
to legislation, for the courts have thus far shown an unwillingness to break through
their self-created crust of legal doctrine." Time for a Statute, supra note 4, at
521; see also Note, Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 389, 404-34 (1983).
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channel wrongful discharge claims into pre-existing arbitration mech-
anisms or other established tribunals.2 16 These proposals, however,
do not fully address the increased cost of administering independent
unjust dismissal arbitration programs. 217
One issue that should be addressed on the state legislative level
is the validity of employer disclaimers on employment literature. 21
As the controversey over the current status of the employment
doctrine continues, employer disclaimers will no doubt proliferate
as a first line defense to wrongful discharge suits. 2 9 In order to
address the problems these disclaimers raise, such as unequal bar-
gaining power between the parties 2 0 or the creation of possible
contracts of adhesion; 21 legislatures must balance employers' fears
of disseminating any personnel literature that might be miscontrued
with the employees' need to rely upon employer representations.
Personnel handbooks and related literature serve both management
and workers by promoting communication, outlining policy and
describing benefits and responsibilities. 222 Legislative prohibition of
employer disclaimers may eventually cause employers to refuse to
disseminate personnel literature. 
23
IV. Conclusion
The preceding analysis has shown that modification and restruc-
turing of the traditional employment at will doctrine towards a more
progressive, flexible approach redresses a hundred-year-old wrong
against employees. While employers will undoubtedly bear additional
administrative costs, they will benefit from a more loyal and pro-.
ductive workforce in the long run and may ultimately improve
profitability.
216. See The Need for a Federal Statute, supra note 214, at 340 (discussing
arbitration selection procedures for unjust discharge cases); Howlett, supra note
202, at 168-70 (discussing possible mediation-arbitration system of review); Time
for a Statute, supra note 4, at 521-32 (discussing arbitration procedures); see also
Bellace, supra note 56, at 232-47 (proposing statutory guarantee against unfair
dismissal enforced through same state procedures used for unemployment com-
pensation claims).
217. See Schauer, Discussion, 32ND ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
RESEARCH Ass'N 183, 183-86 (1979) (advocating adoption of voluntary discharge ap-
peal procedures as more cost-efficient).
218. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
219. See Decker, supra note 199, at 223-26.
220. See id. at 222.
221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222. See Decker, supra note 199, at 210-12.
223. See id. at 223-30.
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In a reluctant way, the courts and legislatures are addressing a
profound shift in labor philosophy and psychology. This shift is
from an inhospitable, adversarial employee/employer relationship to
one concerned with performance and fundamentally based upon
principles of fairness and equal treatment. Judicial support given to
prominent disclaimers in employee handbooks retards this progress,
as does narrow legislative interpretation or, worse yet, no legislative
reaction at all. Responsible employers will agree and respond to this
development, while those who prefer to adhere strictly to the employ-
ment at will doctrine will suffer the gradual loss of their workers
to more equitable environments.
The ultimate solution to employment at will is to balance em-
ployees' needs for fair treatment with employers' needs to maintain
efficient productivity. The business community may continue to ad-
vocate that "the most enlightened judicial [and legislative] policy is
to let people manage their own business their own way." 22 The
developing trend, however, in employer/employee relationships is to
balance the equities of fortune and require fair, consistently applied
termination procedures for just cause, rather than permit unfettered
termination at will.
Patricia M. Lenard
224. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911).
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